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Abstract 
From the perspective of pharmaceutical companies, R&D outsourcing offers a range of benefits. For 
example, costs that were otherwise fixed can become variable, and firms can gain rapid access to a 
large set of new technologies. Recent theoretical work has added to the list by connecting R&D 
activities characterized by economies of scope and knowledge spillovers -- those that are likely to have 
the biggest effect on industry economics and social welfare – to the ability of large drug companies to 
capture a disproportionate share of economic value from, and transfer a disproportionate share of 
financial risk to, small new technology providers. The low profitability and high risk associated with the 
provision of such outsourced R&D activities reduce incentives to invest in new for-profit ventures that 
specialize in the most promising early-stage projects. We hypothesize that the short- to medium-term 
efficiency gains from R&D outsourcing may, therefore, be offset by slower innovation in the long run.  
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1. Introduction           
 
Recently, long-awaited evidence of an increase in the productivity of research and development (R&D) 
has appeared in the biopharmaceutical industry. When measured by the number of new molecular 
entities (NMEs) approved each year in the US, divided by the effective number of researchers, 
productivity started increasing around 2007 (Bloom et al., 2020). When considering the ratio of the 
same number of NMEs to R&D spending, the upturn occurred in 2010 (Ringel et al., 2020). Until that 
change, the latter ratio had halved approximately every nine years since 1950, indicating an 
exponential rise in R&D costs per new drug approval for 60 years, a trend known as ‘Eroom’s Law’ – 
from the familiar Moore’s Law (Lundstrom, 2003), but in reverse – after a paper by Scannell et al. 
(2012). The extent to which financial productivity measures will follow these other measures is not yet 
clear (Ringel et al., 2020).  
 
The productivity upturn occurred several decades after the start of major R&D outsourcing, which 
began in the early 1980s. Established pharmaceutical companies initiated contractual relationships 
with new biotechnology firms in complement to -- or as a substitute for -- internal discovery programs 
(Pisano, 1991, 2006), and also with contract research organizations (CRO) for a range of activities (e.g., 
animal toxicology testing, chemical synthesis, etc.), including clinical testing services (Azoulay, 2004; 
Shuchman, 2007). An acceleration was observed in the number of arrangements of all kinds -- e.g., 
minority holdings, joint R&D partnerships, arms-length R&D contracts, etc -- in the early 1990s (Lerner 
and Merges, 1998; Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006; Mowery, 2009).  The range of capabilities covered 
by these arrangements has evolved in waves, starting from screening systems, rational drug design 
and combinatorial chemistry in the late 1980s, followed by technologies related to gene expression, 
proteomics and bioinformatics by the early- and mid-1990s (Hopkins et al., 2007). Since then, leading 
R&D-investing companies have increasingly engaged in multi-year contracts with specialized 
technology and service providers for the co-discovery and development of new therapies. The majority 
of alliances involved early-stage projects, although the share of mid- and late-stage agreements 
increased in the early-2000s, contributing to a steady decline in the number of products originated in-
house among the larger firms (Thiel, 2005). In the last decade, high growth in the outsourcing of both 
discovery functions and in CRO-conducted clinical trials has been observed (Schuhmacher et al., 2016), 
and is expected to continue (Buvailo, 2020).  
 
Over the years that preceded the improvement in R&D productivity, the growth in external technology 





development. Scholars and industry experts have recognized in these strategies “a new engine of 
growth” (Quinn, 2000), “a new, more effective way of conducting R&D” with biotechnology companies 
(Kettler, 2000), and “new models of working” with contract research organizations (Cavalla, 2003) for 
a more efficient allocation of resources. Specialized industry publications – often emanating from the 
management consulting profession – have also presented R&D outsourcing as part of the solution to 
the problem of declining R&D productivity. For example, the same year that the ratio of the number 
of approved NMEs to R&D spending finally started to increase, one could read that “[t]he majors – Big 
Pharma, often outsource parts of their R&D value chain to improve productivity of their R&D efforts. 
The overall idea is always to increase the pace of drug development, reduce cost and maintain 
standards” (Bhagwat, 2010). 
 
In this note, however, we question the contribution of the increasing use of R&D outsourcing on the 
productivity of discovery and development operations at the industry level. We first briefly review the 
advantages and disadvantages, from the viewpoint of pharmaceutical companies, of sourcing R&D 
externally over the use of internal capabilities, together with the empirical evidence on the relative 
efficiency of the two approaches. We then discuss the characteristics of outsourced R&D operations 
that drive the distribution of profits and risks among industry participants, and thereby shape 
incentives to invest. We find that certain kinds of early-stage firms will systematically fail to 
appropriate the industry-level value their R&D services create. We conclude that policy measures may 
be needed to shift the distribution of value from the consumers of outsourced early-stage R&D, 
typically larger companies, to the providers of outsourced early-stage R&D, and to shield the latter 
from the transfer of risk that is a standard feature of many R&D contracts. 
  
 
2. R&D outsourcing by pharmaceutical companies 
       
The main advantages of R&D outsourcing, as identified by scholars and industry experts, and from the 
viewpoint of pharmaceutical companies, include: (1) more flexibility, with fixed costs transformed into 
variable cost, and an easier exit from unsuccessful programmes; (2) higher productive efficiency when 
a specialized external R&D provider has distinctive proprietary capabilities, or a platform technology 
allows for economies of scope across a range of projects conducted for several partners; (3) better 
management of uncertainty, as outcome-based transfers -- e.g., milestone payments -- allow for risk-
sharing among contracting parties (Quinn, 2000; Cavalla, 2003; Mittra, 2007); (4) and perhaps, as some 
industry participants have argued to us, that outsourcing makes the cost of R&D more transparent, 





      
On the other hand, R&D outsourcing arrangements create problems. For example: (1) new 
biotechnological firms often lack the financial strength necessary to successfully run highly risky 
projects that address new disease targets of interest for established pharmaceutical companies (Arora 
et al., 2004); (2) at the development stage, performance in knowledge-intensive clinical projects, for 
the identification of new hypotheses and causal associations -- as opposed to more routine data-
intensive projects -- is more difficult to measure when conducted by a CRO than internally (Azoulay, 
2003); (3) at all stages of the R&D process, there may be loss of control, know-how leakages, and 
regulatory compliance failures by a contracting party (Cavalla, 2003; Jones, 2007); and (4), 
serendipitous observations, which play an important role in pharmaceutical R&D (Mittra, 2008; Yaqub, 
2018), may be less likely to occur when a biotech or a CRO conducts contracted activities for its 
downstream partners.1 
 
Given these pros and cons, did outsourcing discovery and development activity mitigate the long-
lasting decline in R&D productivity?  
 
The empirical evidence is mixed. Some studies that used US data prior to 2001 found better 
performance for R&D conducted in alliances rather than in-house (Nicholson et al., 2005). The alliances 
had a higher probability of success in late-stage clinical trials, even more so if the licensee was a large 
firm (Danzon et al., 2005). However, other studies reached different conclusions. They found that 
failure rates were higher when a biotechnology firm undertook a drug project with a collaborative 
partner rather than when a single pharmaceutical firm conducted the project (Pisano, 1997). Further, 
although alliance projects – where a drug is developed by a small firm and financed by a larger one – 
were more likely to move from phase-1 to phase-2 clinical trials than integrated projects, they were 
then less likely to move from phase 2 to phase 3 and to receive regulatory approval (Guedj, 2005). In 
another empirical study, biotech firms had lower innovative performance – measured by the 
probability of drug approval – compared to established pharmaceutical companies (Arora et al., 2009). 
                                                          
1 Yaqub (2018) introduced a taxonomy of serendipitous discoveries: “Mertonian” serendipity when a work on a defined 
problem serendipitously finds a solution to that problem (e.g., the discovery of the drug Salvarsan after a long series of 
failures against the same bacterial pathogens); “Walpolian” when work on a defined problem serendipitously finds a 
solution to a different problem (e.g., the discovery of Penicillin, or the discovery of anti-angiogenic drugs in oncology); 
“Bushian” when the solution of a pre-existing problem is serendipitously applied to a new problem (e.g., the successful anti-
cancer drug methotrexate as a treatment for rheumatoid arthritis); and “Stephanian” when an unexploited technology, that 
was hitherto waiting for a problem, serendipitously finds a new problem (e.g., pertuzumab added to trastuzumab in HER2 





In a large dataset on R&D projects between 1990 and 2017, various types of originator-developer 
relationships yielded higher attrition rates than cases in which a pharmaceutical company integrated 
the two roles (Pammolli et al., 2020).2 Recent empirical results outside the biopharmaceutical context 
are no more favourable to R&D outsourcing. A study with firm-level data across all industries over the 
1983-2000 period finds that a 10% rise in outsourced R&D does not increase revenues (a measure of 
firms’ output), while the same rise in internal R&D increases revenues by 1.3% (Knott, 2020).  
 
 
3. Economies of scope and knowledge spillovers      
 
Has R&D outsourcing contributed to the recent reversal of the long term decline in R&D productivity?  
 
New formal modelling helps answer that question by shedding light on the effect of R&D outsourcing 
on the financial performance of a producer (an independent for-profit unit) and on downstream users 
of R&D outputs, and on incentives to start uncertain projects (Billette de Villemeur and Versaevel, 
2019). Our central argument is that outcomes of outsourcing R&D operations are not limited to 
enhanced flexibility or increased efficiency in the conduct of existing projects, as investigated in the 
empirical literature. The contractual arrangements between an external R&D provider and its 
pharmaceutical partners also have an effect on the distribution of profits and risks among participating 
parties, and thus on the anticipated rewards to entrepreneurs and capital providers for starting new 
ventures (a biotech start-up, a CRO, …). In some circumstances, that depend in particular on the nature 
of outsourced activities (discovery, pre-clinical studies, management of clinical development, …), the 
distribution of profits and risks can be so favourable to the downstream pharmaceutical partners as to 
undermine upstream incentives to invest. It follows that outsourcing has not only an effect on the 
performance of current R&D programs, but may depress the investment in the new technologies that, 
in the long run, make R&D more productive.    
 
In economic terms, the distribution among participants of the profits generated by and risks inherent 
in alliances depends on structural characteristics of the market for R&D. Specialized technology and 
service providers are positioned on the supply side. We call these firms “R&D providers”. A smaller 
number of large established pharmaceutical firms, on the demand side, earn revenues from a variety 
of franchises, and can adjust -- to some extent -- their sourcing of external inputs by modulating 
                                                          
2 Pammolli et al. (2020) also find that the performance of biotech firms acting as developers – a case of forward integration 





investments in internal capabilities. We call these firms “big drug companies.” They have bargaining 
power when the time comes to design an external contract with an R&D provider that faces a high rate 
of entry of new competitors, and needs financial resources (Cockburn, 2004). Another important, and 
countervailing, market feature is that several big drug companies might have interest in tapping the 
distinctive competences of the same R&D provider. It has been documented that, from 1994 to 2001, 
biotech companies started an average of six partnerships with large pharmaceutical firms (Higgins, 
2007). Competition among the big drug companies can benefit the R&D provider whose management 
is in a position to respond positively to only some, and possibly none, of the contenders’ contract 
proposals. The terms of these contract proposals (typically an upfront amount, possibly an equity 
stake, plus payments that are conditional on ex post contracting R&D outcomes and sales) provide 
financial incentives to engage in uncertain R&D tasks. They also determine the R&D provider’s bottom 
line if the project fails, and its appropriable share of the economic value generated by a new medicine 
in the event of success. The R&D provider’s expected financial performance, as considered before 
operations start, thus depends on the transfers received from each big drug company in return for 
defined R&D outcomes both in adverse and in favourable circumstances.3 
 
Economic modelling (Billette de Villemeur and Versaevel, 2019) shows that the expected profit to R&D 
providers depends on economies of scope across R&D programs, and on knowledge spill-overs across 
big drug companies that intend to outsource new technology. The modelling assumes that both R&D 
providers and big drug companies seek to maximise their profit. There are economies of scope when 
competencies in the pursuit of one project can be leveraged to others, so that the cost to an R&D 
provider of engaging in a specific project with a big drug company is made lower by also contracting 
with other big drug companies. Science-based platform technologies are likely to generate economies 
of scope in early-stage R&D tasks (Mittra, 2008). There are knowledge spillovers when unsolicited 
technological inputs are received from other firms, as occurs for example by examining the information 
disclosed in patents filed by competitors, when a competitor’s drug of known mechanism succeeds or 
fails in clinical trials, or because of labour mobility within the industry. The move of the drug industry 
towards more open models of R&D – involving the participation in precompetitive consortia, or the 
                                                          
3 An historical discussion between a biotech and several potential partners, at a pre-innovation stage, occurred in early 
1978. It involved the science-based start-up Genentech and two large producers of insulin from animal pancreas glands, Eli 
Lilly and Novo Industri (which merged with Nordisk Gentofte to become Novo Nordisk in 1989). A first arrangement was 
concluded whereby Eli Lilly agreed to finance Genentech’s project on biosynthetic human insulin at $50,000 a month, “a 
modest research support” (Hughes, 2011, p. 86). It is only at a later stage, after Genentech had succeeded in producing 
human insulin with recombinant technology, that the two parties signed a twenty-year exclusive agreement with an 





installation of research facilities in proximity of biotech clusters (Munos and Chin, 2009; Schuhmacher 
et al., 2018) – can enhance exposure to knowledge spillovers. 
 
Empirical studies have shown that late-stage development activities are characterized by dis-
economies of scope -- serving more than one firm implies congestion -- and reduced or non-existent 
knowledge spillovers (Danzon et al., 2005; Macher and Boerner, 2006). Such situations imply a high 
degree of rivalry among big drug companies, as each of them would strongly benefit from exclusive 
access to the technological assets. For example, a CRO may not be able to enrol a sufficiently large 
number of volunteers for several phase-3 trials that rival big drug companies contemplate starting to 
test their respective candidate vaccines against the same disease (diseconomies of scope). And if the 
technology platforms for these vaccines are different, there is little useful knowledge to be gained 
from the research milestones and subsequent clinical results of competitors (no technological 
spillover). Then our theoretical analysis predicts that an R&D provider can take advantage of 
competition between big drug companies to secure a significant margin, which indicates that 
incentives to supply late-stage development services are preserved. 
  
The conclusion is different when the public good characteristics of early-stage research entail 
economies of scope and substantial knowledge spillovers, as empirically shown at the individual level 
of research projects by detailed data obtained from major pharmaceutical firms (Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1996; Cockburn and Henderson, 2001). Typically, a new platform technology that emerges 
from basic academic research, in connection to a university laboratory, is likely to offer a large set of 
different applications, possibly in relation to open science strategies, including publications co-
authored by academic and industry scientists (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Fabrizio, 2009), 
resulting in an improved performance of discovery activities (Jong and Slavova, 2014). In that case, the 
conduct of operations by the R&D provider in contractual relation with big drug companies can result 
in lower costs and better targeted efforts – by cross fertilization and internalization of spillovers – 
toward the discovery and characterization of new active substances, and thereby improve research 
productivity. Such circumstances, however, do not entail the same degree of rivalry from the big drug 
companies as when technological conditions imply exclusive contracting and minimal knowledge 
spillovers from competitors. In a technological context characterized by significant spillovers, it can be 
rational for a big drug company to wait for a competitor to contract with an R&D provider and, only if 





or more effective drug.4 Should all big drug companies adopt the same reasoning, an equilibrium in 
contract offers is reached that precludes the R&D provider from appropriating a substantial share of 
the industry value generated by its research efforts.5 For founders of an R&D provider, the 
consequences are a worse financial performance and higher vulnerability to adverse events, which 
lead to a reduced incentive to invest. This theoretical conclusion matches long-term measures of the 
financial returns across the pharmaceutical and biotech sectors; a dollar invested in diversified basket 
of pharmaceutical firms and a second dollar invested similarly in biotechnology firms in 1980 would, 
with dividends reinvested, have been worth $114 and $8, respectively, by the end of 2015 (Thakor et 
al., 2017). The biotech sector is also characterized by a much higher project-specific (idiosyncratic) 
level of risk (Thakor et al., 2017). 
 
More specifically, a positive aggregate measure of economies of scope and inter-firm knowledge 
spillovers is found, in theory (Billette de Villemeur and Versaevel, 2019), to imply a share of expected 
profits to the R&D provider that is driven to zero despite the R&D provider’s aim of profit maximisation. 
Moreover, some of the risks of the big drug companies – which appropriate the entirety of expected 
profits – are transferred through outcome-based contracts to the R&D provider. In that case, investing 
in an R&D provider is tantamount to buying a lottery ticket at a price equal to the expected value of 
the prize; something that few professional investors would consider doing. This formal result points to 
two important observations: the financial returns to an R&D provider can be disconnected from the 
economic (and medical) value – possibly very high – that outsourced research could generate; 
moreover, an R&D provider that exactly breaks even ex ante, together with the valuable projects to 
which it contributes, is highly vulnerable to unfavourable events that lead to a negative net return ex 
post. These two observations indicate weak incentives for financiers to invest in early-stage science-
based projects which, in principle, are precisely the ones that have the potential to lead to critical 
advances toward new medicines.6 
                                                          
4 This possible strategy is already clearly described in Rosenberg (1990, p. 167), with no reference to an external R&D 
provider though: “If there are significant spillovers of knowledge between firms, then a late-mover could gain the same 
knowledge at a lower cost while, at the same time, avoiding the major mistakes that the first-mover made en route.” 
5 This conclusion is reminiscent of the “classic” analysis by Teece (1986) of an innovator's ability to appropriate the profits 
generated by its efforts: “when imitation is easy, markets don't work well, and the profits from innovation may accrue to 
the owners of certain complementary assets, rather than to the developers of the intellectual property” (p. 285). 
6 These two points echo a more general statement in a seminal paper by Nelson (1959, p. 302), according to whom “[i]t is 
clear that for significant advances in knowledge we must look primarily to basic research; the social gains we may expect 
from basic research are obvious. But basic research efforts are likely to generate substantial external economies. Private-





4. Conclusion: Towards a policy response 
 
The entry rate of new R&D ventures is directly related to anticipations of financial returns by 
entrepreneurs and capital providers. These (expected) returns depend on the nature of tasks 
contracted-out by pharmaceutical firms. Formal economic analysis predicts positive returns to those 
who provide R&D services when economies of scope across projects and technological spillovers are 
limited, as in the provision of clinical development activities by a CRO, or in late-stage agreements 
(e.g., new compound licensing after proof-of-concept) with a biotech, which can benefit from 
competition between pharmaceutical firms. By contrast, early-stage research activities that are most 
likely to generate efficiencies toward critical discoveries and breakthroughs, and thus can greatly 
contribute to increase the productivity of efforts towards new therapies and preventives, are predicted 
to be at the lower bound of the range of expected profits to external R&D providers. The characteristics 
of these activities – akin to those of public goods – mean that they give up most of the value they 
generate to the large pharmaceutical partners, with outcome-based contracts that shield the latter 
firms from idiosyncratic risks. Financial returns to founders of independent science-based R&D 
providers thus fail to reflect the economic and medical value they can generate and the risks they bear. 
Weak investment incentives may therefore hinder the foundation of the start-ups with most potential 
at the industry and societal levels; those with large knowledge spillovers and economies of scope. The 
short- to medium-term benefits of R&D outsourcing are thus likely to be offset by slower cumulative 
progress than is socially desirable in the long run. This theoretical diagnosis also offers a powerful 
explanation for some otherwise puzzling past industry trends; most obviously, the markedly superior 
investment returns from the pharmaceutical sector versus the biotechnology sector (Pisano, 2006; 
Thakor et al., 2017) between 1980 and 2015; returns which accrued, paradoxically, while the 
biotechnology sector was gaining share of both the R&D pipeline and of global drug revenues. The 
theoretical results may also help explain some of the decline in biopharmaceutical R&D productivity 
between 1950 and 2010, a decline which occurred despite huge scientific progress and brute-force 
efficiency gains (Scannell et al., 2012).  
 
Some strategies appear to have been adopted by industry participants to mitigate the problems that 
the theoretical analysis highlights. On the supply side of the intermediate market for new technology, 
entrepreneurs and the venture capital industry now invest large sums to build technologies with 
potential spillovers and economies of scope into integrated drug discovery firms rather than R&D 





Galapagos NV).7 As drug discovery firms, they can appropriate financial value by using their technology 
to develop drug candidates, apply on their own for regulatory approval, and enter the final market for 
medicines. However, biotechnology risk capital is expensive (Harrington, 2012) and investment can be 
very hard to secure. When compared with an R&D service business model, the approach is likely to 
forego economies of scope by addressing only a fraction of possible applications. Because of reduced 
interactions with downstream drug companies, the approach will also likely delay and reduce 
informational spillovers that might otherwise enhance collective knowledge, increase industry value, 
and benefit patients. Therefore, these approaches do not eliminate what is a structural problem. 
 
Initiatives have also been observed on the demand side of the market for new technology, where major 
pharmaceutical companies investigate new modes of collaboration with external contributors. For 
example, pre-competitive consortia have been funded by drug industry coalitions that involve 
universities for the production of new science-based knowledge to be used by commercial and 
academic scientists alike (Williamson, 2000). Other moves include the relocation of research activities 
to regional innovation hubs close to universities (e.g., Cambridge),8 the creation of innovation centers 
where company and external scientists are encouraged to discuss drug discovery challenges, and the 
setting up of crowdsourcing platforms where networks of experts are invited to help solving 
technological problems (Schuhmacher, 2016). Even though these open innovation strategies can 
generate medical value by facilitating the production of knowledge spillovers and the identification of 
economies of scope, they also reinforce the public good characteristics of R&D outcomes. 9 The likely 
consequence is an exacerbation of the profit appropriation and risk transfer issues that benefit 
downstream drug companies in relation to existing technology providers, at the cost of reduced private 
incentives to start new science-based ventures at the upstream level. 
We believe that reflections on a policy response are needed, as efforts in that direction seem under-
represented in the outsourcing and R&D productivity literature. One approach would be to mitigate 
                                                          
7 Galapagos NV, which communicates on its ambition “to become a fully integrated biotechnology company” (van de 
Stolpe, 2019), is transforming itself into a commercial organization in order to launch a new treatment of rheumatoid 
arthritis after receiving approval for European markets in summer 2020. 
8 For example, AstraZeneca chose to relocate its global R&D centre and corporate headquarters in Cambridge Biomedical 
Campus, in the hope that “cross-fertilisation with other companies, institutes and researchers will create novel routes to 
discovery” (Buckland, 2018). 
 
9 Open innovation initiatives of this kind can be interpreted as attempts by big drug companies to “weaken the upstream 






the long-run incentive problem by requiring cross-equity transactions (e.g., the upstream partner 
receives some payment in the form of shares in the downstream partner and the downstream partner 
takes an equity stake in the upstream partner). It may also be desirable to cap outcome-based 
milestone payments in favour of higher upfront payments to limit the ability of downstream partners 
to transfer risk. A more profound approach would be to identify new redistribution mechanisms at the 
industry level for the financing of science-based new ventures, and for their protection from project-
specific uncertainties. It may, of course, turn out that the optimum redistribution mechanism is general 
taxation and more public sector spending on technologies that offer economies of scope and large 
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